THE
ARCHIVES (2010-Part 1)
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2010 Season: First Quarter Thoughts
For the first time since 1970, no NFL team made it through its fourth game of
the season without losing at least once. The reason is simple: Special teams.
Call it the Blanda Curse.
QC looked it up. In 1970, the NFL and AFL played their first merged season.
Today, most people old enough to remember the year remember it as the year
Oakland's ageless kicker and back-up quarterback,
George Blanda, staged a
mircacululous 5-game run that began in Week 6 and
culminated in Week 10 with a field goal that beat San Diego. After one
memorable finish, Raiders' broadcaster Bill King effused, "George Blanda
has just been elected King of the World!" For his efforts in 1970, NFL
coaches and owners and the Maxwell Club awarded Blanda the
Bert Bell Award as MVP of the league.
But before Blanda went on his run, kick and punt returners, led by Chicago's
Cecil Turner, turned the league upside down. In the
first 4 weeks of the 1970 season (52 games), NFL returners brought back 9 kicks
for touchdowns. That's a return TD in about 17 percent of all games.
At the quarter pole of the 2010 NFL season, returners have been even more
dominant. In 76 games, returners have scored 12 TDs and 2 blocked punts and 1
blocked field goal have been brought back to the house. That's a special teams
return TD in about 19.7 percent of all games.
As QC's 8th
Commandment holds, special teams involve little coaching in the form
of play design. On Sirius NFL Radio, Baltimore head coach John Harbaugh,
himself a former special teams coach, said members of kickoff and punt coverage
teams "either can do it or they can't." In other words, as in
baseball, a coach can only change players on special teams, he really cannot
change the plays in a meaninful way.
As a result, despite the rantings of fans and media, head coaches correcly are
reluctant to blame special teams coaches for failures. In Miami, following a
41-14 loss to New England in which the Patriots returned a kickoff and a
blocked field goal for touchdowns and blocked a punt that led to a third TD,
head coach Tony Sparano took the unusual step of dismissing special teams coach
John Bonamego. But in doing so, Sparano acknowledged that the players were
primarily at fault.
"It's a hard decision to make,"
Sparano said. "I know how hard this guy works.
Nobody works harder than him at what he does. Special teams is a hard area
because there's a lot of hands involved in that area. What I mean is the
players have some responsibility in that area, too. And the players change a
lot in that area. Our players also need to take responsibility."
In San Diego (2-3), the Chargers coverage teams have been shockingly abysmal.
But after melting down against Oakland (2 blocked punts that accounted for 12
points) in a 35-27 loss to the Raiders, head coach Norv Turner dismissed the
idea that special teams coach Steve Crosby should be dismissed as
"silly." In response to the suggestion
that Crosby should be sacked,
Turner said, "We're going to get the right guys
on the punt team that are going to do the right job. We've got an oustanding
coaching staff, and I have nothing but the highest regard for what Steve Crosby
does."
If any coach ever had the right to use a special teams coach as a scapegoat,
it's Turner. Turner's designs, in the hands of QB Philip Rivers, have made the
Chargers offense infinitely productive ($) and by far the best in the league.
True, San Diego usually gives away a few turnovers, but any business that
generates such great returns has to take a little risk. Turner's designs can
afford the turnovers. In addition, San Diego's defense has been very good.
Indeed, the Chargers "D" has yielded only 6 touchdowns all year to
opposing offenses.
What San Diego cannot afford is catastrophic special teams breakdowns. All-Pro
kicker Nate Kaeding has bounced back from his 2009 playoff debacle (3 missed
field goals, 2 inside 40 yards, in a 17-14 loss to the New York Jets), but the
Chargers coverage teams have given up 4 touchdowns (2 kickoff returns to
Seattle's Leon Washington in Week 3, a punt return, and a blocked punt return)
and a safety (blocked punt). Under these circumstances, Turner's refusal to
even question his special teams coach qualifies him as one of the NFL's
strongest, most stand-up guys.
Also, events could turn around for Turner and his team. Last year, San Diego
started the year 2-3 and then ran off 11 straight wins. It could happen again.
Special teams breakdowns and turnovers (the other great bugaboo of the 2010 NFL
season) can disappear as mysteriously as they appeared. That is the nature of
random events. Overall, better designed and coached teams are only 5 games off
the expected pace of winning 75% of all games. There is still plenty of season
left for events to even out.
But that might not be enough for some fans and media members. Some people
simply cannot accept that sometimes events are beyond the control of a head
coach and have to find someone to blame. Since no rational explanation
exists for the Chargers special teams difficulties, QC offers an irrational
explanation: The George Blanda Curse.
Long before Blanda went on his epic run in 1970, he had the opportunity to sign
with the fledgling Chargers in the start-up AFL. But, because Sid Gillman
reminded him too much of his prior coach who did not appreciate his skill,
George Halas, Blanda spurned the Chargers for the Houston Oilers. Thereafter,
Blanda's fire always burned a little hotter when Houston met San Diego and the
Oilers defeated the Chargers in the first two AFL title games.
After Houston released Blanda because it thought he was too old (at age 39),
Blanda joined Gillman's protegé, Al Davis, in Oakland and continued his
rivalry with San Diego.
On Monday, September 27, the day after the Chargers special teams imploded
against Seattle, Blanda passed away. As a result, Blanda was not
around when the Chargers traveled to Oakland to meet the Raiders on Sunday. One
special teams melt down of the magnitude San Diego suffered against Seattle and
the Raiders could happen to anyone. But two such melt downs perhaps suggest
Oakland received help from the "other side."
Maybe, just maybe, the explanation for the Chargers special teams failures in
Oakland is simply this: Cantankerous George Blanda simply could not resist
sticking it to San Diego just one more time.
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YOU MAKE THE CALL: TRUE or FALSE
Will the San Diego Chargers recover and win the AFC West? (Use Twitter or the
headset to send TRUE or FALSE and your reasons to QuantCoach.
Please let QC know if we may post your tweet/message on The Chalkboard.)
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2010 Season Week 4 Thoughts
As QC learned first-hand during his Week 4 pilgrimage to Titletown, Wisconsin,
everything at and about Lambeau Field is about football. Outside Lambeau, at a
tailgate party on Lombardi Avenue, you will find a
10-foot replica of
the Lombardi Tropy in a neighbor's front yard. Inside Lambeau,
if you go to the
can, you will find an intimidating portrait of former Packers'
middle linebacker Ray Nitschke glaring down at a ball-carrier he just knocked
on his can. At Lambeau, they really sweat the details. So, QC's Week 4 NFL
thoughts focus in detail on the Packers and their bitter rival, the Chicago
Bears.
**********
Green Bay's 28-26 win over Detroit was a perfect QC game. If you look at
ESPN's box score for the game, the Lions dominated
every statistic you will ever hear about on Sports Center. Detroit QB
Shaun Hill passed for more than 150 more yards than Green Bay signal-caller
Aaron Rogers. (Lions' tight ends Brandon Pettigrew and Tony Schefler did most
of the damage, combining to catch 14 of Hill's passes.) The Lions also
out-rushed the Pack (123-to-92) and gained more yards per rushing attempt
(5.9-to-4.4). Although Detroit made plenty of mistakes, Green Bay actually
committed one more turnover (4-to-3). The Lions also held a massive time of
possession advantage (37:37-to 22:23).
The only statistic where the Packers held an advantage was in
QCYPA (11.706-to-6.130). However, behind Rogers'
efficient passing (12-17-181-3 TDs), Green Bay's advantage in QCYPA evidenced
an unlimited play design advantage. Further, as QC often reminds
readers, when a team such as Green Bay has QCYPA greater than 9 yards per
attempt and a team such as Detroit has QCYPA less than 6.692, the better
designed team with the much greater QCYPA wins about 95 percent of the time.
(On this day, QC's hometown Cincinnati Bengals demonstrated in a 23-20 loss to
the Cleveland Browns that one way to end up in the 5 percent of teams that lose
when holding this advantage is to commit 2 turnovers that lead to a pair of
field goals, get a field goal of your own blocked, and commit a critical
offensive pass interference penalty late in the game to take your team out of
field goal range. In other words, you really have to want it to lose
when holding this advantage.)
QC will be honest: It is a rare occasion indeed when QC truly is rooting for a
particular NFL team to win on any given Sunday. This was one of those
occasions. Here's to the power of unlimited play design.
**********
With the Packers win over the Lions and the success of the pilgrimage safely
assured, QC, The Coach, and The Boy retired to the
1951 Lounge at the
Comfort
Suites to see if New York could knock Chicago from the ranks of the
unbeaten. The Giants did so, sacking Bears' QB Jay Cutler 9 times in the first
half, on the way to a 17-3 victory. For the game, Chicago's offense, which had
been infintely productive coming into the game, generated
miniscule player productivity of 1.10, the worst
mark by any team in any game in the NFL this season.
Mike Martz coordinated offenses have always been bi-polar boom or bust machines
that do not have much stable middle ground. Also, Martz is renowned for
stubbornly sticking with what he believes should work (and often does work)
even when it clearly is not working. Chicago fans will enjoy more boom Sundays
like the first 3 weeks of the season as well as few more busts. In the end,
look for the NFC North race between the Bears and the Packers to be decided,
just as it should be, in a frigid January 2 showdown on the frozen tundra at
Lambeau.
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YOU MAKE THE CALL: TRUE or FALSE
Is Green Bay the best place in the NFL to see a game live? (Use Twitter or the
headset to send TRUE or FALSE and your reasons to QuantCoach.
Please let QC know if we may post your tweet/message on The Chalkboard.)
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2010 Season Week 3 Thoughts
Week 3 of the 2010 season was
Black Sunday for play designers. Every NFL coach
stresses to the media that in order to be successful, his team must avoid
turnovers (and penalties) and be solid in the kicking game. Week 3, better
coached teams (i.e., teams with better play design) went 9-7 as turnovers and
break downs in the kicking game proved costly. It was the worst Sunday for play
designers since QC began keeping coaching stats in 2008. Coaches harping on
turnovers and special teams is a cliché, but they do it because they
have little to no power in these areas. When you hear a coach talk about
turnovers and special teams, what you should be translating in your brain is
the following, "If the players can just not screw up the things the
coaches cannot control or even influence, then we have a good chance to win on
Sunday because the coaches have designed a good plan to win. But if the players
screw up, our design plan will not matter."
All over the NFL on Sunday in Week 3, design plans did not matter. Here is the
parade of horribles.
**********
In New York's 29-10 loss to Tennessee, coach Tom Coughlin's slightly better
designed Giants handed over 3 turnovers (while receiving none from the Titans),
missed 2 field goals, gave Tennessee a safety with a chop block in the end
zone, and committed numerous personal foul penalties.
**********
In New Orleans 27-24 overtime loss to Atlanta, coach Sean Payton's offense led
by QB Drew Brees was infinitely productive ($), but the Saints committed 3
turnovers and kicker Garrett Hartley missed a 29-yard field goal in overtime
that would have won the game. It was the 4th shortest missed overtime field
goal in history.
**********
Carolina missed a great chance to win a game, falling to Cincinnati, 20-7. The
Bengals offense, particularly QB Carson Palmer, was barely above the
JaMarcus Cable (2.00 Hy
) and committed 2 turnovers. QB Jimmy Clausen survived a
wretched first-half and numerous dropped passes, but the Panthers could not
overcome 3 lost fumbles and a Clausen interception.
**********
In Denver's 27-14 loss to Indianapolis, Broncos QB Kyle Orton out-gunned the
Colts' Peyton Manning for most of the day. But 2 costly Denver turnovers and 2
questionable failed 4th down calls by McDaniels who eschewed easy field goals
left the Broncos behind by a touchdown in the fourth quater. Manning then went
all P-rex and scavenged the Denver secondary for a game-clinching score.
**********
In San Diego's 27-20 loss to Seattle, the Chargers bestowed 5 turnovers upon
the Seahawks to off-set another one of Norv Turner's well-designed game plans.
Even worse, San Diego special teams yielded kickoff return touchdowns of 101
and 99 yards to Seattle's Leon Washington.
**********
In Oakland's 24-23 loss to Arizona, the day began badly for the Raiders when
the Cardinals' LaRod Stephens-Howling returned the opening kickoff for a
touchdown. Behind QB Bruce Gradkowski, however, Oakland refused to quit and
seemed to be in good position to win as kicker Sebastian Janikowski set up for
a 32-yard field goal with :04 to play. He missed it wide left. Janikowski also
missed a 41-yard field goal earlier in the game.
**********
Oddly, QC has no gut-wrenching explanation for Washington's 30-16 loss to St.
Louis. Coach Mike Shannahan designed a competent game plan that was superior to
Rams' counterpart Steve Spagnuolo and the Redskins' players produced better
than St. Louis. Washington did suffer 2 turnovers, but so did the Rams.
Redskins kicker Graham Gano was a perfect 3 for 3 (29, 24, 21) and punted
adequately when Washington's regular punter could not go. While Shannahan may
be criticized by others for accepting short field goals rather than going for
it when inside the St. Louis 15-yard line, this is almost always a winning
strategy when a team is better designed and more productive, as the Redskins
were. What can you say? It was
Black Sunday.
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YOU MAKE THE CALL: TRUE or FALSE
Was Week 3 the worst week for special teams in the history of the NFL? (Use
Twitter or the headset to send TRUE or FALSE and your reasons to
QuantCoach. Please let QC know if we may post your tweet/message on The
Chalkboard.)
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2010 Season Week 2 Thoughts
Avast me hearties! Week 2 of the 2010 NFL Football Season just happened to fall
on International Talk Like A Pirate Day. Football has
more in common with pirates than you might think. First, almost all pirates are
guys so a certain amount of barbarism, while not condoned, should be expected.
(QC is looking at you
New York Jets.) Second, both football coaches and
pirates speak a language that is virtually incomprehensible to the everyday
landlubber. Finally, pirates are private parties, not government actors
(for government pirates: see soccer), that engage in war-like acts. Of course,
like pirates, sometimes coaches can get carried away, such as when the
"Long John Silver" of pirate coaches, former
Texas Tech coach Mike Leach, fell victim to a mutiny
after converting a
storage shed into the brig, but mostly pirates and
football are simply fun. So, to honor International Talk Like A Pirate Day,
here are QC's Week 2 pirate thoughts.
**********
Appropriately, the Buccaneers won on Talk Like A Pirate Day. Tampa Bay improved
to a surprising 2-0 with a 20-7 win over Carolina in which second-year QB Josh
Freeman continued to impress. On draft day two years ago, many so-called
experts scratched their heads when the Bucs picked Freeman in the first round
but coach Raheem Morris said they would have picked Freeman over Matt Stafford,
the first pick in the entire draft, if the team had to make a choice between
the two. Who is saying Arrr! now?
**********
The corrollary to the Buccaneers winning on Talk Like A Pirate Day is that it
is appropriate that the navy lose. Since Navy plays college football and is not
in the NFL, the next closest thing would be for Bill Belichick, the son of
long-time Navy scout Steve Belichick, to lose. Belichick and the Patriots
obliged and fell to the Jets, 28-14. Unlike Belichick, New York's swashbuckling
Rex Ryan just seems like a salty-tongued pirate, all full of bluster. (In
NFL-speak, swashbuckling is known as "swagger.") On Sunday, his Jets'
plundered New England by collecting 3 turnovers as booty and, with a
rejuvenated LaDanian Tomlinson, establishing the rum... er, run.
**********
This much we know: Pittsburgh pirates are no threat to anybody. However, me
hearty, the Pittsburgh football crew has something better than a pirate cap'n
in defensive coordinator Dick LeBeau, a latter day
Prospero who is capable of creating a confusing and
dangerous tempest through manipulation of heat and pressure. Against Tennessee,
LeBeau conjured up a storm that bewildered Titans' QB Vince Young and resulted
in 7 turnovers as the Steelers prevailed, 19-11, without a breath of
offense.
**********
In the CFL, Saskatchewan fans and media were nearly ready to make coach
Ken Miller walk the plank even though their Rough
Riders defeated rival Calgary, 43-37, in overtime. What caused the
sound and fury was this. In the CFL, a team is
awarded 1 point for a touchback if a punt or field goal goes through the end
zone or is not returned from the end zone, which is 25 yards deep. (In
contrast, an NFL end zone is only 10 yards deep.) On the last play of
regulation, Saskatchewan had the ball at the Calgary 28-yard line and the
prairie wind at its back. Rather than attempt a 35-yard field goal, Miller sent
in punter Eddie Johnson and instructed him to punt the ball out of the end zone
for a the game winning single.
This is a situation that an NFL punter can only dream about: The game winning
punt! In order to punt the ball out of the end zone, Johnson had to punt it
about 53 yards. Earlier in the game, with the wind at this back, he had
delivered a 53-yard punt and a 56-yard punt. But on this play, Johnson's punt
traveled only 40 yards and Calgary easily returned the punt out of the end zone
to force overtime. Miller's decision created an uproar amongst those who
thought the field goal was the obvious choice and the coach almost cost the
team the game.
However, it seems to QC, who owns 1 Class A share of the Saskatchewan Rough
Riders and hence has economic standing to second guess Miller, that the
coaches' decision was reasonable. In essence, Miller faced a 7-10 split. Under
the circumstances, he thought it would be easier for a player to deliver length
than it would be for a player to deliver accuracy. It was a close call. But, as
QC's 8th
Commandment states, neither play (punt or field goal) involved any
play design. It was simpy a best-guess. Although Miller's guess did not work
out as he had hoped, one can be sure that if he had guessed field goal and
kicker Luca Congi had missed and the ball had been returned, plenty of Monday
Morning Quarterbacks would have been screaming that he was a numb-skull for not
punting with the wind at his back and a strong-legged punter.
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YOU MAKE THE CALL: TRUE or FALSE
Did Saskatchewan coach Ken Miller make the right call in punting for a single
and the win against Calgary? (Use Twitter or the headset to send TRUE or
FALSE and your reasons to QuantCoach. Please let QC know if we may post
your tweet/message on The Chalkboard.)
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2010 Season Week 1 Thoughts
It is not too early to jump on the Houston Texans bandwagon. While most people
are talking about rookie RB Arian Foster's 200-plus yards in the 34-24 win over
the Colts, what impressed QC more was that Houston was lucky. Though the Texans
won, Indianapolis and Peyton Manning actually were better designed and more
productive. In 2009, Houston was 9-7, but winless when it was not better
designed. While it is much less common than people think for a running back to
carry his team to victory with a great individual effort (such as that of
Foster and his offensive line), particularly a rookie running back playing in
his first NFL game, every year one NFL team is snakebit. Last year it was
Houston. It won't be this year. We already know that QB Matt Schaub, WR Andre
Johnson, and TE Owen Daniels can sling it with the best teams in the NFL. The
Texans only will get better on defense when LB Brian Cushing returns from
suspension. If you are a Houston fan, go all-in.
**********
While the Texans seem to have shaken off their dark cloud, it still won't be
easy in the AFC South which looks like the best division in football. The Colts
look more vulnerable than at any time in the past decade, but Manning will not
go quietly. Jacksonville and QB David Garrard played well in a 24-17 win over
Denver. Moreover, in Tennessee the Titans steam-rolled the Raiders as Vince
Young once again put up elite QB design and productivity numbers. Since taking
over as the starter in '09, no QB in the NFL has consistently achieved high
efficiency more than Young. Everyone already knew Tennessee had the best RB in
the NFL in Chris Johnson, a tremendous offensive line, a solid defense, and a
capable coaching staff led by Jeff Fisher. If Young continues to play at such a
high level of efficiency, the Titans are Super Bowl contenders.
**********
Why does the media hate Wade Phillips and Norv Turner?
Both Dallas and San Diego lost because of classic player failures, turnovers
(Tashard Choice & Ryan Matthews fumbles), penalties (Alex Barron hold), and
special teams break-downs (Dexter McCluster's punt return for a TD). As QC's
8th Commandment
and 9th
Commandment state, these are player failures, not coach failures as
such errors involve little or no play design.
Still, after Barron's holding penalty cost the Cowboys a TD and a win in
Washington, so-called "professional" media members viciously lashed
out at Phillips, calling him the worst coach in the NFL. Only Sports
Illustrated's
Peter King took a reasoned approach. King labeled RB
Tashard Choice's fumble after a short pass reception on the last play of the
first half that DeAngelo Hall returned for a TD an "idiotic play,"
but at least he did not place primary idiocy on Phillips. "Phillips took
the blame," King wrote, "but [offensive coordinator] Jason Garrett
should have known to call a kneel down. [QB Tony] Romo should have known to
audible to a kneel down if it wasn't called from the sideline. Choice should
have known to lay on the ground...."
But here is one thing that even King missed: Phillips out-coached Washington's
Mike Shanahan. Dallas' defense, which Phillips coordinates, held Washington to
productivity (2.03 HA ) just barely above the
JaMarcus Cable, the standard for offensive ineptness
in the NFL. But for two player failures by Garrett's offense,
Dallas would have won. And, given that defense dominated, the only conclusion
one could rationally reach is that Phillips out-coached Shannahan, an
offense-oriented head coach like Turner whose design far exceeded Kansas
City's, but could not over-come Matthews fumble and McCluster's punt
return.
Look, Phillips and Turner may not be on the level of the "Trinity":
Vince Lombardi, Bill Walsh, and Bill Belichick. They may not have the complete
knowledge of both sides of the ball or the ability to see the entire field as
the members of the Trinity could. But they are dad-gum good on their respective
sides of the ball and nice fellas who are generous with their time and good to
the media.
So members of the media: Why do you hate Phillips and Turner?
**********
After Detroit fell to Chicago, 19-14, all anyone wanted to talk about was
whether the Lions got jobbed when an apparent TD catch by Calvin Johnson was
rendered a harmless incompletion by the letter of the NFL law. If you were a
little more broad minded, you might have gotten to QB Matt Stafford's shoulder
injury. But if QC was a Lions fans, what he would be focusing on would be that
Detroit's pass defense was shredded yet again. Using offensive coordinator Mike
Martz's play designs, the Bears incurred the cost of a couple Jay Cutler
interceptions and some red zone sputtering, but still generated infinite player
productivity. Head coach Jim Schwartz came to the Lions as an up-and-coming,
data-driven defensive master-mind and he has added two solid pass rushers up
front in Ndamukon Suh and Kyle Vanden Bosch. But Detroit still does not look
any better on pass defense. If that continues, it is going to be another long,
long year in the Motor City. And grumbling about Schwartz will start.
**********
Philadelphia looked spectacular in their kelly green uniforms in a 27-20 loss
to Green Bay. The Eagles were so outfitted to honor the 1960 team led by tough,
nasty guys like QB Norm "Dutch" Van Brocklin and LB/C Chuck Bednarik,
who defeated the Packers in the 1960 NFL Championship Game, 17-13.
So Sunday's slug-fest, which was a battle of attrition with players being
carried off the field on what seemed like every play, was the perfect way to
honor the 1960 NFL champions, right? Wrong.
The 1960 Eagles are one of the great forgotten teams of the NFL and were one of
the first teams who built their attack around the pass rather than the run.
Indeed, to this day, no NFL champion has averaged fewer yards per rushing
attempt than those Eagles. Philly has probably been forgotten because Van
Brocklin was as crusty as they came and because their title was sandwiched by
the great Johnny Unitas/Raymond Berry Colts of '58 and '59 and Lombardi's
championship run. But that is a shame.
"Van Brockin was a coach in Philadelphia,"
Robert Gordon wrote in The 1960 Philadelphia
Eagles: The Team That They Said Had Nothing But A Championship. "He
worked full-time in the off-season for the Eagles' coaching staff."
"Dutch was exceptional in his knowledge of the game," said Sonny
Jurgensen, who was Van Brocklin's back-up that year. "Sometimes, Dutch
would call plays that didn't seem to make sense. I'd question him about some of
his calls when he got to the sideline, and he always had good tactical reasons
for them. Maybe it was the way the defense was reacting to a certain play,
maybe he wanted to set them up for something on the next series of downs.
Whatever the reason, he was always setting the opponent up. He was out a few
steps ahead of them. Usually, he was right. I got an education just watching
him."
"Van Brocklin was far ahead of his time in knowing how to read
defenses," said former broadaster Pat Summerall. "As for passing, he
could throw the ball as well as any quarterback before or since." Fellow
broadcaster Bill Campbell agreed on both counts. "Van Brocklin was an
awesome pure passer," Campbell said. "But I think his greatest
attribute, besides leadership, was his in-depth knowledge of the game. In my 52
years of covering this game, I learned more by listening to Dutch than everyone
else put together."
Van Brocklin shared his knowledge with his teammates and designed plays for
Hall-of-Fame flanker Tommy McDonald, ends Pete Retzlaff and Bobby Walston, and
running backs Ted Dean and Billy Barnes. The Eagles averaged over 9 yards per
pass attempt and McDonald caught 13 TD passes.
"With McDonald, Walston, and Retzlaff, and with Dean and Barnes coming out
of the backfield, we had a big play team, a term that really hadn't been
popularized at that point," said reserve end Jerry Reichow. "But
that's what we had. Running still dominated the game in '60, but our team had a
pass-oriented attack, and a quarterback who could come up with big plays
anywhere on the field."
Van Brocklin's signature victory was the 17-13 championship win over Green Bay
and Lombardi. In the game, the Packers ran 60% more plays than the Eagles (76
to 48), gained more than 100% more rushing yards (223 to 99), completed a
higher percentage of passes (60% to 45%), and accumulated more first downs
(22-13). Philadelphia also fumbled the ball away twice and threw an
interception while Green Bay suffered only one turnover.
Yet, the Eagles prevailed because their offense operated at 104% efficiency
(10.4 YPA), while the Packers' offense operated at only 52.5% efficiency (5.25
YPA). Clearly, Philadelphia's only edge over Green Bay was the productivity of
their research and design. But that edge was an unlimited design
edge.
In the decade that followed the Eagles' 1960 NFL Championship, the Packers
captured NFL title after NFL title and the rest of the NFL sought to copy
Lombardi's design. But no NFL team sought to copy the Eagles' alpha passing
design that was superior to Lombardi's run to daylight design. Not
surprisingly, when the 1960s came to an end, Philadelphia was still the only
team that had ever defeated Lombardi's Packers in a meaningful NFL playoff
game.
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YOU MAKE THE CALL: TRUE or FALSE
Are the Houston Texans for real? (Use Twitter or the headset to send
TRUE or FALSE and your reasons to QuantCoach. Please let QC know
if we may post your tweet/message on The Chalkboard.)
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As the
Football Outsiders pointed out recently, it is that
time of year when all NFL blogs and web-sites are duty bound to make
predictions for the upcoming NFL season even though everyone knows that the
overwhelming odds are that these predicitions will be wrong.
FO's David Gardner put it this way:
"Let's say we think the Baltimore Ravens have the best chance of any team
in the AFC to make it to the Super Bowl -- 20 percent, perhaps. For the sake of
argument, we'll also say that Indianapolis, New England, and Pittsburgh each
have a 10 percent chance to make the Super Bowl, ten other teams have a five
percent chance, and Cleveland and Buffalo are there to make sure everybody has
a full schedule. OK, so we pick Baltimore to win the AFC. Even based solely on
this opinion, there is four in five chance the pick will be incorrect. So
preseason predictions are all going to be mostly wrong. It is unavoidable.
"
However, as ESPN's Lee Corso would say, "Not so fast my
friend." QC has 3 rock-solid, air-tight, 100% guaranteed, this-will-happen
predictions for readers on this the day before the 2010 NFL season gets
serious.
Prediction No. 1
Teams that are better coached as defined by QC's play design statistic
(HA
) will have more productive players as defined by QC's player
productivity statistic (ðHY) in more than 95% of all
games.
Prediction No. 2
Teams that are better coached as defined by QC's play design statistic will win
between 75%-to-80% of all games.
Prediction No. 3
Teams that are better coached as defined by QC's play design statistic that
lose will: (a) commit more turnovers than the opponent or (b) suffer breakdowns
on special teams such as missed field goals or punt returns for TDs in at least
75% of all games they lose despite being better coached.
These predictions are money. QC invites you to follow along this season or come
back at the end of the year and verify the accuracy of these predictions. They
will be accurate.
Unfortunately, QC cannot tell you if and when a team, say FO's beloved
Baltimore Ravens, will be better designed than its opponent or commit more
turnovers than its opponent or yield a punt return for a TD.
Yet.
(Archives
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YOU MAKE THE CALL: TRUE or FALSE
Better coached teams will win between 75 and 80 percent of all NFL games this
year? (Use Twitter or the headset to send TRUE or FALSE and your
reasons to QuantCoach. Please let QC know if we may post your tweet/message on
The Chalkboard.)
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Here at quantcoach.com, QC continuously
emphasizes the importance of research and development in football, particularly
the importance of R&D in play design.
But in order to test play designs, NFL researchers--coaches--need to take the
designs out of the laboratory and apply the designs on the field. The NFL's
pre-season is one place where researchers do this.
Recently, the NFL proposed expanding the regular season to 18 games. Currently,
the NFL's 4-game R&D pre-season is probably the perfect length from the
researcher's perspective as it constitutes 20% of all non-playoff games in a
season (20 games). However, a by-product of the expanded regular season would
be that the NFL pre-season research period would be cut in half from 4 games to
2 games. Simply, as most every business does in a down economy, the NFL is
trying to cut costs (here R&D costs) and simultaneosly increase revenue by
re-defining research as finished product.
From the fan's perspective this makes perfect sense. Customers do not want to
pay the same price for R&D games (pre-season game) that they pay for
finished product games (regular season). But the reality is that customers must
pay the fixed costs of R&D for every other product that is put on the
market. Why should NFL customers expect that they are entitled to a finished
product without paying for the R&D? It makes no sense.
Perhaps the NFL can provide the same quality finished product regular seasons
games to its customers at half the R&D expense (10% of all games, rather
than 20%). But that remains to be seen. If the NFL can do so, then the expanded
season is a good idea. But if the NFL let the researchers and developers--the
coaches--decide the issue, QC's guess is that the NFL's pre-season R&D
period would remain as it is.
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YOU MAKE THE
CALL: TRUE or FALSE
Extending the NFL's 16-game season to 18 games and thereby reducing R&D
will adversely affect the quality of play in NFL regular season games? (Use
Twitter or the headset to send TRUE or FALSE and your reasons to
QuantCoach. Please let QC know if we may post your tweet/message on The
Chalkboard.)
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In grading a players' performance in a game,
Green Bay's legendary coach, Vince Lombardi, awarded a "2" for a
superior block or tackle, a "1" for a satisfactory performance, and a
"0" for an unsatisfactory performance.
Sports Illustrated writer Tim Layden's book, Blood, Sweat and Chalk: The Ultimate Football Playbook: How the
Great Coaches Built Today's Game, which details football's
greatest play designs and designers, is a "2."
QC should know. In 2008, he uncovered and told many of the same stories in a
scholarly paper, Quantifying NFL Coaching: A Proof of New Growth
Theory, that are the foundation of the QuantCoach coaching
statistics. Indeed, Layden's book is so similar to the paper, that QC, who
relied upon two of Layden's Sports Illustrated articles as sources,
thought perhaps Layden had read the paper. But the aknowledgments do not
indicate he did.
This is of no great matter particularly when Layden tells the story of play
design on the offensive side of the ball. From Lombardi's sweep and the triple
option of Bill Yeoman's veer and Texas' wishbone to Walsh's rhythm passing West
Coast Offense, Layden nails offense. Other than not giving the great Army coach
Earle "Red" Blaik--who mentored Lombardi, Yeoman and Sid Gillman
(Walsh's foundation)--enough credit, Layden is insightful. In discussing
Walsh's signature play, the shallow cross, Layden notes "the tight end
runs a 10-yard cross, stretching the linebackers horizontally, while the 'X'
receiver runs across the formation from the opposite side, capitalizing on the
chaos created by the tight end." Here Layden uses the term
"chaos" in the Biblical sense to mean the void or open area that
Walsh's design created. It's a reverse "Creation Story." This seems
appropriate as like all great football coaches, Walsh loved a well-executed
reverse like the one involving Freddie Solomon that he sprung on Dallas in the
1981 NFC Championship Game.
Layden observes that "a play's value is not only in the play itself, but
in the counter it sets up." He wryly notes that "innovation is often
accidental, and it certainly is in football." Layden's recounting of how
Yeoman discovered the triple option and current Michigan coach Rich Rodriguez
discoverd the zone read makes it sound like the exact same historical accident
occurred on two different practice fields that were separated by 1200 miles and
30 years. (Yeoman comes across as perhaps the most underrated football
innovator in history. His name keeps popping up.)
Moreover, consistent with the principles of Growth Theory, Layden notes that
non-rival knowledge that is available to all coaches is at the heart of the
game. "Coaches find each other. They hang together and eat together--and
they speak a language that nobody else really understands. It is their way of
finding normalcy. But it's also a way of staying in the endless loop of
innovation. Friends do not hide discoveries from each other."
Layden is correct only to a point here. In Layden's book, "'the offense
gets the chalk last,'" to borrow a phrase from run-and-shoot innovator
Mouse Davis. "'That's coachspeak,'" Davis told Layden. "'The
expression derives from the practice of coaches scheming offenses and defenses
together on a chalkboard, passing the chalk back and forth in response to the
other's moves. He who moves last has the advantage.'"
History teaches that this indeed is the story of play design in the NFL. In
response to Vince Lombardi's power sweep, Dallas' Tom Landry designed the
"Doomsday" flex defense. In response to Walsh's passing game, New
England's Bill Belichick designed mysterious defenses that to this day defy
easy description. However, Landry and the flex are not even mentioned in
Layden's book and Belichick is only along as a sort of curator of history.
Layden makes no attempt to analyze the most abstract defensive mind in the
game's history. (Although, to be fair, Layden does include an excellent
narrative on Dick LeBeau's zone blitz concepts.)
QC speculates that perhaps the reason Layden overlooked Landry and did not
presume to attempt to analyze the inscrutable Belichick is the common human
tendency to think of things that are very much alike as being exactly alike
when in fact those things have subtle differences. For example, one can think
of a Lombardi or Walsh offense as a ship that is trying to cross a sea to get
from Port A to Port B. If so, a Landry or Belichick defense likewise must be a
ship that goes out to sea and attempts to sack or intercept the offensive ship,
right?
Not necessarily. Another way to conceptualize the defense is as the sea itself.
On the surface, the sea may appear to be something that it is not below the
surface. This deception may result in conditions that keep the ship from ever
reaching Port B and, even after succeeding, defy description or tendencies that
could be charted in a way that would enable the offensive captain and navigator
to know what to expect the next time they go to sea. QC believes that it is
this subtle conceptual difference that distinguishes great offensive coaches
like Lombardi and Walsh from great defensive coaches like Landry and
Belichick.
Nevertheless, it is perfectly clear that Layden gets it right throughout this
book. In the end, Layden quotes Duke University coach David Cutcliffe to
succinctly summarize the role of play design in football. "'Here's what a
system does: It tries to put players in a position to succeed. That's what it
is.'"
For that answer alone, Layden gets a "2."
(ARCHIVES;
ARCHIVES2;
ARCHIVES3;
ARCHIVES4)
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YOU MAKE THE CALL: TRUE or FALSE
Is Tim Layden's "Blood, Sweat, & Chalk" the best book about
football play designers ever written? (Use Twitter or the headset to send
TRUE or FALSE and your reasons to QuantCoach. Please let QC know
if we may post your tweet/message on The Chalkboard.)
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